


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DIRECTORATE OF
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1. CAMBODIA

The Communists have scored an important diplomatic success in Phnom Penh by recognizing Cambodia's borders.

Chief of State Sihanouk confirmed on 13 June that North Vietnam's diplomatic mission will be upgraded to an embassy as a result of Hanoi's 8 June statement recognizing Cambodia's territorial integrity within its "present borders." One of Sihanouk's major objectives in recent years has been to obtain such recognition. Sihanouk also said that the Viet Cong's Liberation Front would soon be accorded "diplomatic status" in Phnom Penh because it had issued a similar statement on 31 May. Moscow and Peking also have made similar statements during the past few days.

The Vietnamese statements were apparently in response to Sihanouk's call last month for international recognition of Cambodia's borders. Hanoi presumably considered that such an unspecific expression of recognition was a small price to pay for the gains to be had. There is no indication that the Communists have made any concessions on the actual delimitation of Cambodia's "present borders," however. Last fall the Vietnamese refused to sign an agreement defining the border, asserting they were unwilling to commit themselves to precise boundary lines until the end of the Vietnam war, and were unable to meet other Cambodian demands.

Sihanouk will almost certainly renew efforts to get Hanoi to sign a more meaningful border agreement. The present broad statements of recognition, however, will help offset the effects of Sihanouk's current campaign against the Cambodian left, which has been accompanied by frequent allusions to the malevolent influence of the "Viet Minh." They will also serve to reinforce Sihanouk's belief that Cambodia has more to gain by working with the Communists than with an unresponsive and antagonistic South Vietnam.

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2. GREECE

The military junta in Athens continues its quiet but determined efforts for complete control.

The appointment of new mayors, governors, and officials in key ministries and quasi-governmental agencies illustrates the firmness with which the regime intends to carry out its rejuvenation of the Greek scene. Economic and fiscal study groups have also been created. Many of those appointed are from the military.

Several non-Communist politicians were arrested in recent weeks, most of them closely aligned to the imprisoned [redacted] Andreas Papandreou. Statements likely to upset law and order are now subject to severe penalties in the military courts. Strict control of the news media is still maintained.

The junta has consistently expressed its intention to return to parliamentary government when the "proper conditions exist." In fact, the constitutional revision committee which met last week for the first time was urged to complete its work by 15 December. No timetable for the promised referendum has yet been mentioned, however, and the leadership has made it clear that it does not intend to relinquish power until the "revolution has finished its tasks."

One recurrent theme from Athens is surprise at the cool US response to the regime in spite of the junta's expressed desire for continued close relations with the West. The coup leaders protest that the US apparently has misunderstood the necessity for the military take-over, and they have hinted that resentment and anti-American sentiment could result. The regime obviously wishes to stimulate additional dialogue with US officials. [redacted]

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3. BOLIVIA

After nearly three months of sporadic activity, the confrontation between government forces and some 60 to 100 Castroist-led insurgents in south-central Bolivia is still a standoff.

President Barrientos is reportedly extremely discouraged by the army's performance thus far. He believes the guerrillas cannot be defeated without outside support--including equipment and men.

While the army is engaged in the south, extremists have managed to marshal some support for the guerrillas among the peasants and miners.

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[REDACTED] Demonstrations in the mining area in support of the guerrillas were partly responsible for the government's declaration of a state of siege on 7 June. Miners at the important Huanuni and Catavi complexes have declared these areas "free territory," independent of government jurisdiction. The miners are in a restive mood and violence could break out at any time.

President Barrientos is aware that prolongation of the guerrilla problem will have increasingly sharp repercussions on the political situation. Maneuvering by the opposition parties to form a united front against the government had begun before the first guerrilla incident, but has intensified lately. Barrientos is working hard to delay opposition unity, but may in the process create more dissension among his supporters.

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